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Most  policies  that  aim  to  redistribute  resources  among  the  population  are  motivated  by  equity 
concerns.  During the Depression in the 1930s, equity concerns played a key role in the adoption of 
farm subsidies, when urban interests joined farmers and rural legislators to give “agriculture a fair 
share in the national income.”
1  By the 1960, when the farm population had dwindled and subsidies 
were ballooning, equity concerns prompted cries to limit, reduce, or even eliminate farm subsidies.  
That debate over equity came to a head in the 1970 Farm Bill, when Congress enacted payment 
limits on agricultural subsidies for the first time.  Recently, in light of greater transparency in the 
subsidies received by individuals and against the backdrop of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Doha Development Round negotiations, concerns about equity in farm subsidies have reemerged as a 
major policy issue. 
Spurred on by equity considerations the 91
st Congress implemented farm subsidy payment 
limits in 1970 in order to “put an end to the scandal of these gigantic payments,” in the words of Rep. 
Silvio  Conte.
2      The  1960s  saw  an  increased  public  awareness  that  farm  subsidies  were  highly 
concentrated among a few farms.  One economist noted, “The concentration is really of no concern 
to the economic policy goal of resource efficiency for production of agricultural products.… The 
concern comes from the equity goal, i.e., our concern that income and wealth are more unevenly 
distributed than we desire” (Paulsen 1969, p. 1237).  
  Equity concerns were not the only motivating force behind the adoption of payment limits.  
The public perception of equity also played a large role.  An influential study by Undersecretary of 
Agriculture John Schnittker stated, “One cannot build a strong economic case for or against limiting 
the size of price support loans.  Limiting price support loans may have merit, however, as public 
                                                 
1 Nourse, Davis, and Black (1937, p. 20) report that, “Executives of industrial companies, mail-order houses, 
railroads, banks, and other agencies which depended to a large extent on business originating in the country had 
joined the demand that ‘something be done for the farmer.’” 
2 Rep. Silvio O Conte. “Farm Payment Limitations: An Idea Whose Time Has Come.” Congressional Record 115: 
15869–71, June 16, 1969. 
 relations for farmers.”
3 Representative Paul Findley, a staunch supporter of payment limits, echoed 
the  sentiment,  stating,  “Annual  payments  as  high  as  $4  million  to  a  single  farmer  bring  these 
programs into such disrepute as to threaten their survival.”
4 
  Payment  limits  still  play  a  vital  role  addressing  inequality  among  farms.    In  discussion 
surrounding the 2002 Farm Bill, Sen. Charles Grassley echoed Paul Findley’s remark from three 
decades earlier, “How long will the American people put up with programs that send out billions of 
dollars to the biggest farm entities?  All this does is damage our ability to help people we originally 
intended to help—the small and medium-sized producers.”
5  Sen. Grassley has championed tighter 
payment limits, a torch picked up by the Bush administration in 2005 in order to reduce deficit 
spending. 
  In spite of the important role payment limits play, little is known about their efficacy and 
effects on farm structure.  Anticipating the potential effects of payment limits before their 1970 
adoption,  Schnittker,  in  his  1968  report  (p.  10869),  stated,  “One  of  the  serious  administrative 
problems sure to arise would result from proposed division of farms into smaller units if a limitation 
were imposed, in order to evade the limit.”  Thirty-six years later, the Government Accountability 
Office (2004b, p. 3) echoed that concern, “Some farming operation may reorganize to overcome 
payment limits to maximize their farm program benefits.” 
  Anecdotes  abound  regarding  the  lengths  some  farmers  go  to  in  order  to  avoid  payment 
limits.
6  The 2004 GAO report titled, “USDA Needs to Strengthen Regulations and Oversight to 
Better  Ensure  Recipients  Do  Not  Circumvent  Payment  Limitation”  (GAO  2004b),  documented 
                                                 
3 See “Schnittker Study of Payment Limitations.”  Congressional Record, 115(70): 10867–72, April 30, 1969.  p. 
10868 
4See “Schnittker Study of Payment Limitations.”  Congressional Record, 115(70): 10867–72, April 30, 1969.  p. 
10868  
5 See “Senate Votes to Lower Farm Subsidy Ceiling.”  Washington Post, February 8, 2002.  p. A06. 
6 See the report of Vann Irvin, a Georgia farmer whose family farm restructured and collected $800,867 in 2005 in  
Dan Chapman, Ken Foskett, and Megan Clarke, “How Savvy Growers Can Double, or Triple, Subsidy Dollars.”  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, p. 1A, October 2, 2006. several specific cases of farms organized to maximize subsidy receipts and avoid payment limits.  In 
spite of the case studies and anecdotes, little empirical evidence exists regarding the extent to which 
constrained farms reorganize in order to avoid payment caps. 
  The extent to which payment limits distort behavior is an important, unanswered question.  If 
constrained farms can easily restructure in order to avoid the payment cap, then payment limits are 
ineffective  policy  tools  that  only  cause  deadweight  loss  by  funneling  productive  resources  into 
unproductive activities, such as restructuring.  The evidence presented below constitutes a first look 
at the potential ineffectiveness of payment limits. 
  The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 established payment limits for each of 
three different types of Title I crop subsidies: direct payments, countercyclical payments, and loan 
deficiency payments/marketing loan gains.  Of the three subsidy types, direct payments are the most 
certain.  Direct payments are attached to the land, and farmers receive direct payments regardless of 
price  or  their  productivity.    Countercyclical  payments  depend  on  market  prices,  but  like  direct 
payments they are land-specific subsidies that do not depend on production.   Finally, loan deficiency 
payments/marketing loan gains are production subsidies that depend both on price and a farmer’s 
productivity. 
  That payment limits affect farmer behavior can be seen most clearly by focusing on 
direct  payments,  the  ex  ante  known  subsidy.    Because  each  farm  knows  its  total  annual  direct 
payment in advance, the producer knows how binding the payment limits will be.  Consequently, it is 
possible that farmers know how to restructure their farm organization in order to get the greatest 
subsidy without being limited by payment caps.  The evidence presented in figure 1 bears this out.  
Figure  1  illustrates  the  distribution  of  direct  payment  for  wheat  and  rice  in  the  2004  crop  year.  
Panels  a  and  c  illustrate  the  distribution  of  payments  across  FSA  farms  for  wheat  and  rice, 
respectively.    The crop-specific subsidy distributions over FSA farms are smooth and symmetric.  
Superimposed on each of the panels is a solid, vertical line depicting the $40,000 payment limit for direct payments.  At the FSA farm level, it appears that relatively few wheat farms receive subsidies 
above  the  cap.    Yet  a  considerable  portion  of  the  rice-farm  subsidy  distribution  lies  above  the 
payment cap.  
  Of course, payment limits apply to members of the farm organization, not to the farm itself.  
Panels b and d, therefore, depict the distribution of direct payments across farm members for wheat 
and rice, respectively.  The distribution for wheat farm members in panel b is smooth and symmetric, 
reflecting the distribution across FSA farms, with relatively few people receiving payments above the 
limit.
7 
  Panel d, however, tells an entirely different story.  Rather than having a standard bell-curve 
shape, this distribution is bimodal, with a sharp peak just before the payment limit.  The irregular 
shape of this distribution in panel d, the coincidence of the distribution peak for rice farm members 
just before the payment limit, and the relatively high proportion of FSA rice farms affected by the 
payment  limit  suggest  that  constrained  rice  farms  restructure  their  organization  in  order  to, 
essentially, bypass payment limits.  Operationally, one might consider a strategy like that employed 
by  farmer  Vann  Irvin,  as  reported  by  The  Atlanta  Journal-Constitution.
8    When  payment  limits 
looked  to  be  binding,  Irvin  brought  his  mother  and  nephew  into  the  farm  organization,  thereby 
maintaining total farm subsidies while keeping each recipient below the payment limit. 
  The graphical evidence is most clear for rice farms,
9 where the greatest proportion of farms 
are affected by payment limits, but the principle is the same for all crops:  Farms affected by payment 
limits have the ability (and appear) to restructure in order to effectively avoid the limits.  Although 
USDA data indicates that only 1.2 percent of rice subsidy recipients were at the limit, the graphical 
                                                 
7 Payments above the cap are possible through the ‘three-entity’ rule and due to the USDA’s inability to reduce all 
farm organizations to their members. 
8 See the report of Vann Irvin, a Georgia farmer whose family farm restructured and collected $800,867 in 2005 in  
Dan Chapman, Ken Foskett, and Megan Clarke, “How Savvy Growers Can Double, or Triple, Subsidy Dollars.”  
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, p. 1A, October 2, 2006. 
9 Cotton farms show a similar, although less pronounced, pattern in their direct payment distribution. evidence suggests that significantly more recipients (approximately 20 percent) change their behavior 
due to payment limitations. 
  Other suggestive evidence of producer response to payment limits comes from the entry rate 
of new farms.  Table 1 contains the entry and exit rates of new subsidy recipients for four crops—
wheat, corn, cotton and rice—annually from 2002 to 2005.  Although exit rates are similar across the 
four crops, entry rates for cotton and rice, crops with binding payment caps, are on average about 33 
percent (1.8 percentage points) higher than the entry rate for corn and wheat.  The cotton and rice 
industries are undeniably different than the corn and wheat industries, and their different industrial 
structure  may  result  in  a  high  steady-state  entry  rate,  but  one  might  expect  exit  rates  to  be 
substantially different too.  Exit rates, however, are nearly the same across crops.  Higher entry rates 
in the production of these crops also are consistent with previously presented evidence and bespeaks 
a response to the incentive to restructure in order to avoid payment limits. 
  Finally, table 2 presents more evidence that payment limits might not effectively restrain 
subsidy payments.  Loan deficiency payments, marketing loan gains, and certificate exchange gains 
are  three  ways  farmers  can  utilize  the  “marketing  loans”  price  support  program.    Despite  the 
structural  and  procedural  similarities  among  these  three  price  support  methods,  loan  deficiency 
payments and marketing loan gains have a joint, $75,000 payment limit, while certificate exchange 
gains are unlimited.  Table 2 reveals that wheat and corn producers overwhelmingly utilize loan 
deficiency payments, but cotton and rice producers are more likely to receive certificate exchange 
gains. The structure of the cotton and rice industries provides one possible explanation.  Cotton and 
rice  are  more  likely  to  be  marketed  through  a  cooperative,  and  commodity  certificates  “reduce 
[cooperatives’] administrative costs” (Commission 2003, p. 82) by allowing the cooperative to settle 
marketing loans without tracking the total payment to each cooperative member.  Another possible 
explanation is that cotton and rice producers are more likely to face binding payment limits, and 
certificate exchange gains provide a way around that.  These two explanations are not mutually exclusive.  Combined with the arrival rate of new subsidy recipients reported in table 1 and the 
apparent organization of rice farms illustrated in figure 1, this evidence suggests that producers may 
engage  in  rent-seeking  behavior  in  order  to  maximize  subsidy  receipts  and  circumvent  payment 
limits. 
  These finding have policy implications.  First of all, payment limits might only result in the 
diversion of productive resources, what economists call deadweight loss.  Total payments to farms 
might be unchanged.  This, it seems, is the story told by figure 1, panels c and d.  Although the 
subsidy distribution across recipients is distorted, the distribution across farms is smooth. 
  Second, budget savings from tightened payment limits might be illusory.  As long as farms 
can legitimately restructure, they can respond to member-specific limits.   Increased enforcement 
might dampen or limit the producer response, but it also requires resources that offset budget savings. 
  Third, any credible attempt to tighten payment limits must limit farmers’ ability to respond 
by restructuring.  One solution is to better define qualifications to receive farm subsidies.  In 2004, 
the GAO found the current standards to be vague and recommended that the USDA “develop and 
enforce measurable requirements defining a significant contribution of active personal management 
[to the farm]” (GAO 2004a, p. 38).  Restricting who qualifies for subsidies will limit farmers’ ability 
to restructure their organization in order to circumvent payment limits. 
  Increased enforcement of payment limits does not come without cost.  In addition to the 
higher  administrative  burden  to  the  USDA,  the  Commission  on  the  Application  of  Payment 
Limitations for Agriculture (2003) reports potential adverse effects on farms, such as limiting farm 
size to less than efficient scale, and altering rental agreements.  Little evidence exists to substantiate 
or alleviate these claims, making it an area ripe for analysis.  The evidence that does exist (Goodwin 
2006) concludes that wheat, corn, and sorghum farms are unlikely to be affected by binding payment 
limits.    Rice  and  cotton  farms  are  much  more  likely  to  be  affected,  but  there  is  no  systematic 
evidence on how these producers might respond to binding payment limits.  
Conclusion 
The distribution of agricultural subsidies is a perennial subject featured in every Farm Bill debate.  
The press typically focuses on the total subsidies received by large producers, while economists are 
prompt  to  dismiss  subsidies  as  real  gains  because  they  assume  the  benefits  to  be  captured  by 
landlords.  This paper has attempted to shine light on these positions through careful analysis of 
interesting data.   
  The paper explores the extent to which payment limits restrict large farms from receiving 
subsidies.  Using administrative USDA data, it presents several pieces of evidence that, when taken 
together,  suggest  that  potentially  constrained  farms  adjust  their  behavior  and  effectively  bypass 
payment limits.  Any credible payment limit reform must include measures to clearly define and 
enforce the criteria to qualify for subsidies. References 
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 Figure 1 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using FSA administrative data obtained through a Freedom of Information 
Act request. 
Note:  Panels a and c depict the distribution of direct program payments over FSA farms in the 2004 crop 
year for wheat and rice.  The distributions were estimated with kernel density estimation using FSA 
administrative data obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request.  Panels b and c depict the 
distribution of direct program payments over the members of farm entities: that is, the “persons” to whom 
the payment limits apply, for  wheat and rice in the 2004 crop year. The distributions were estimated with 
kernel density estimation using data from the USDA Section 1614 database, obtained through a Freedom of 
Information Act request.  The solid vertical lines signifies the $40,000 payment limit for a “person.”  
Table 1 - Farm Entity Subsidy Recipient 
Entry and Exit Rates 
Crop     Crop Year 
      2002  2003  2004  2005 
Wheat           
  Entry Rate  0.043  0.029  0.032  0.031 
    (0.202)  (0.168)  (0.176)  (0.173) 
           
  Exit Rate  0.041  0.061  0.068   
    (0.199)  (0.239)  (0.252)   
           
  N  660,555  709,358  696,792  679,396 
Corn           
  Entry Rate  0.044  0.028  0.034  0.032 
    (0.205)  (0.164)  (0.180)  (0.175) 
           
  Exit Rate  0.047  0.064  0.075   
    (0.213)  (0.244)  (0.263)   
           
  N  810,406  841,357  842,940  824,539 
Cotton         
  Entry Rate  0.058  0.046  0.045  0.044 
    (0.233)  (0.209)  (0.207)  (0.205) 
           
  Exit Rate  0.053  0.068  0.079   
    (0.225)  (0.251)  (0.270)   
           
  N  129,526  128,897  129,841  126,785 
Rice           
  Entry Rate  0.058  0.059  0.053  0.049 
    (0.234)  (0.235)  (0.224)  (0.216) 
           
  Exit Rate  0.054  0.064  0.075   
    (0.227)  (0.245)  (0.263)   
           
  N  35,269  35,698  35,865  35,224 
Notes: U.S.D.A Farm Services Agency administrative data of subsidy recipients, 
1990 - 2005.  A farm entity is classified as an 'entrant' the first time it is 
observed in the data.  A farm entity is classified as an exit the last time it is 
observed in the data.  Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.  
Difference in totals from Table 5 represent the difference between 'entities' and 
'members of entities.'  
Table 2 - Distribution of USDA Program Payments 
2004 Crop Year 
Crop  Payment Limit  Participants  Mean  Median  Max 
Wheat           
  Direct Payments  $40,000   820,877  1,388.44  254.66  734,641.00 
  Counter-Cyclical Payments  $65,000   NA  NA  NA  NA 
  Loan Deficiency Payments  41,982  1,685.25  608.00  75,423.67 
  Marketing Loan Gains 
$75,000  
4,548  1,656.80  710.43  33,312.00 
  Certificate Exchange Gains  Unlimited  NA  NA  NA  NA 
             
  Overall    821,666  1,482.47  257.00  810,064.70 
             
Corn           
  Direct Payment Program  $40,000   954,920  2,206.34  530.00  343,303.00 
  Counter-Cyclical Program  $65,000   940,847  2,599.15  618.00  355,564.00 
  Loan Deficiency Payments  547,070  4,866.00  1,900.00  477,339.30 
  Marketing Loan Gains 
$75,000  
50,496  5,002.56  2,750.00  117,520.10 
  Certificate Exchange Gains  Unlimited  2,387  8,977.87  1,960.23  1,097,819.00 
             
  Overall    975,942  7,672.96  1,538.00  1,235,474.00 
             
Cotton           
  Direct Payment Program  $40,000   156,211  3,939.29  607.00  568,813.00 
  Counter-Cyclical Program  $65,000   154,644  8,491.74  1,345.72  1,170,884.00 
  Loan Deficiency Payments  43,807  8,844.09  871.26  163,177.10 
  Marketing Loan Gains 
$75,000  
1,404  7,095.22  1,815.21  82,530.60 
  Certificate Exchange Gains  Unlimited  54,269  24,654.42  5,474.06  2,438,102.00 
             
  Overall    159,291  23,571.21  2,709.00  2,688,855.00 
             Rice           
  Direct Payment Program  $40,000   49,126  8,670.01  2,017.54  90,223.84 
  Counter-Cyclical Program  $65,000   48,534  3,283.39  769.96  44,227.50 
  Loan Deficiency Payments  26,096  1,949.35  195.61  64,602.62 
  Marketing Loan Gains 
$75,000  
11,745  3,889.27  1,518.78  59,391.65 
  Certificate Exchange Gains  Unlimited  11,644  2,659.87  836.60  105,584.20 
             
  Overall    49,869  14,293.44  3,126.00  199,373.10 
                    
Notes:  Summary statistics based on payments to entity members found in the USDA Section 1614 Database. 
 